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Abstract
This study develops a dynamic pricing model with a quality substitutable product,
taking into account strategic and myopic consumers. In each of the two periods, the
firm can choose between offering a high quality product, a low quality product or both
and the corresponding price for the product. Strategic consumers compare current
utility with future utility in order to decide the time of purchase and the quality of
the product in an attempt to maximize their utilities. Myopic consumers consider only
current utility in purchasing of the products. We generate scenarios, prove whether
a scenario is feasible and which scenario produces the best profit for the firm. Our
result suggests that the firm obtains the best profit when it provides only high quality
products in each of the two periods. In other words, the firm does not have to offer
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1 Introduction
Dynamic pricing decisions bear significant importance for firms. In recent years it has
been implemented in a wide variety of industries (such as retailing, manufacturing, and
E-business) while exploring new and innovation pricing strategies. The emergence of new
software tools might reflect the importance of dynamic pricing. For example, “Early users of
the new software-Gymboree, J. C. Penney, KB Toys, and ShopKo, among others-are already
reporting promising results, with gains in gross margins in the range of 5% to 15%. Retailers
are also seeing significant increases in process efficiency. Planners at one chain, for instance,
experienced a 20% gain in productivity.” (S.C. Friend and P.H.Walker., 2001) Welcome to
the New World of Merchandizing. Harvard business Review, 79, November 2001.) The same
result (gains in revenue and increased productivity) has been shown by Gallego and Van
Ryzin (1997). They find that “price-based rationing” is a more profitable way to limit sales
than “quantity-based rationing”, since firms reduce the sales and increase revenue at the
same time.
Commonly, to account for dynamic pricing the interaction between retailers and con-
sumers is modeled as two-period setting where consumers visit the store in both periods and
retailers have an opportunity to update the price. A strategy of decreasing the product price
over time enables the seller to take advantage of differences in both consumers’ valuations
of the product and patience level in order to extract consumers’ surplus.
While consumers differ in their patience level, generally academic literature divides the
consumers into two broad groups: strategic and myopic. The former consider the future; the
latter are impulse buyers. The consideration of both types of consumers is essential to the
firm’s pricing decision, so we discuss more about these two types of customers. Consumers
behave strategically, especially when they purchase durable goods or more expensive prod-
ucts. Therefore, models that account for on strategic customers is more realistic. Models
based on strategic consumer behaviour are being used more often recently in the operation
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literature. Bensanko and Winstion (1990) already reveal the fact that “underestimating the
rationality of consumers can have dramatic negative effects on a seller’s profit.” In contrast,
consumers can not always behave strategically. In modern society, consumers all lead very
hectic daily lives and they are reluctant to take time: such as spending time to visit a store
again or searching for the low price. Many researchers have managed to study this complex
and heterogeneous consumer behaviour and reveal that “consumers tend to purchase prod-
ucts spontaneously” (Hughes and Fill, 2007). Therefore, much of the literature has assumed
myopic consumer behaviour. However, in this study we have chosen to consider the model
dealing with strategic as well as myopic consumers.
Besides the pricing decision, other marketing and operational decisions have to be consid-
ered. Product quality is one such consideration. The consideration of pricing and product
quality is not only useful, but essential to the firm. The integration of pricing and qual-
ity/production decisions is still in its early stage in many firms, but it has the potential to
radically improve supply chain efficiencies as well as revenue. Although consumers differ
in the evaluation of quality, they generally agree which product is of better quality. Their
choice preference depends on quality of the product, their evaluation of the quality, location
along the Mussa-Rosen line and the price of the product. Needless to say, it is better for a
firm to satisfy these consumer desires. For instance, many firms in the computer software
industry offer different prices of a single product (professional and student version) of the
same program. When consumers pay the higher price, they are able to download the full
package of the new software (high quality). The lower priced student version has limitations
(low quality).
Consequently, we are motivated in this dissertation to consider both strategic and my-
opic consumers with pricing and product decisions over two periods. Expressed simply, we
introduce a product that has a value from usage both in the first and the second period, but
due to discounting the second period value is lower. While much of literature has assumed a
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single product, we allow the firm to choose between two different quality levels of the product
so that it can sell both in the first period and the second period.
We consider a software developing company with many retailers to distribute the product,
say Microsoft. The software can easily be sold in different quality levels. The users purchase
the installation kits and based on the price paid, different quality of the product components
are installed. They behave as strategic consumers since they purchase durable goods and
can be patient.
We follow the well-known Mussa and Rosen’s model (1978), while incorporating intertem-
poral effects. In their model, two populations of opposite preferences exist. While the goods
are similar and the goods are sold at the same price, the two populations rank them ex-
actly in the reverse order. Especially, Mussa and Rosen’s model derives demand functions
based on consumer’s utility for differentiated goods, and in their utility function, consumers’
valuations of quality vary. We extend their setting by looking at a two period version. Fur-
thermore, we restrict the customer’s valuation of the quality to two in our utility function
and a firm decides to set four prices through the two periods.
In our setting, consumers obtain utility from using the product in the first period and
additional discounted utility from using it in the second period. The firm chooses the product
selection that becomes available to consumers, which means that the firm can choose between
two configurations: high quality and low quality, and can make one or both (or none)
available in each of the two periods.
The firm sets the prices for both the high quality and low quality product price in each
of the periods. We restrict the high quality product price to be higher than the low quality
product. For both, high or low quality product, the first period price is higher than the
second period price. However, no assumption is made regarding the relationship between
the first period low quality price and the the second period high quality price. A strategic
consumer always maximizes the utility in the selection of a product. In other words, when
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two qualities of the product are being offered, the strategic consumer chooses the time and
product that yield the most utility, given the consumer’s location along the Mussa-Rosen
model. On the other hand, myopic consumers purchase a product in the period they visit as
long as their utilities is positive. If a myopic customer’s utility is negative, she will return in
the second period and repeats the process. For each period, myopic customers decide which
quality of the product to purchase by evaluating their utilities.
First, we enumerate all possible scenarios and derive the corresponding prices for each
of these scenarios. Then, we eliminate all non-feasible scenarios and generate conditions for
feasibility for the remaining one. Lastly, we compare the remaining scenarios to find the
scenario that produces the best profit for the firm and characterize the results.
To summarize our results, a firm is better off using intertemporal substitution rather
than product substitution. In other words, the provision of two different qualities in one
period is not beneficial to a firm. Specifically, the firm generates the best profit with the
model in which it provides only high quality product and sets only one price in each of two
periods. This result is in line with that of Bara and Carr (2009). In their model, when a
consumer purchases the product, the firm offers a future upgrade price for a slightly higher
cost. This would be interpreted as offering two qualities of the product in the first period.
However, their result show that offering an upgrade prices (i.e., offering two qualities of the
product) is not always optimal.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Later, we provide
some general idea in our two-period model and elaborate our model in Section 3. In Section
4, we test the feasibility. In Section 5, we test optimality and find the best scenario of the
model. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related Literature Review
In earlier studies, intertemporal substitution, delaying purchase to a future date, was ne-
glected. Models assumed that a consumer either purchases on the first visit or the sale was
lost forever. However, recently revenue management literature has begun to pay more atten-
tion to intertemporal substitution and new models allow more opportunity for anticipation
of future demand. Strategic consumers refer to those who practice intertemporal substitu-
tion and myopic consumers refer to those who make a purchase decision at the time of their
arrival.
Consumers behave more strategically when they face firms’ dynamic pricing mechanisms,
(changing prices over periods). The economic literature has considered the dynamic pricing
mechanism in the presence of the strategic consumer. Modeling the interaction between
strategic consumers and retailers can be found in the famous study of Coas(1972), in which
a monopolist sells a durable good to a large group of consumers with different valuations. He
shows how the seller sets the price in a way that results in perfect segmentation: initially
charge a high price to customers with high valuation, and later sequentially reduce the prices
to customers with low valuation. However, if the high valuation consumers anticipate the
future price decrease, they wait for a lower price. This leads the seller to offer the product
at marginal cost. Coas suggests ways to avoid this result for the firm. One is that the seller
makes a contract with the buyers, not to sell more than a given quantity of the product,
referred to as capacity rationing. The other is that the seller makes a commitment that if
the future price is lower, then the seller will buy back the purchased good.
Bensanko and Winstion (1990) extends management science literature on intertemporal
pricing to include the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers. The
study characterizes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involving a strategic seller and
consumers. The study finds that the demand of strategic consumers is more price elastic
than that of myopic. In addition, the numerical analysis shows that “underestimating the
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rationality of consumers can have dramatic negative effect on a seller’s profit.”
One of the earliest studies, optimal dynamic pricing under strategic consumers with ca-
pacity limitations, by Aviv and Pazgal (2008), analyzes a model with a single price reduction
at a fixed point in time T . A fixed premium price is charged prior to a fixed time T and
a discount price p is charged after time T . Consumers’ arrival is determined by a Poisson
process and their valuations of the product vary across the population. Those consumers
arriving before time T wait to purchase the product if it is beneficial from them. However,
consumers arriving after time T do not have an incentive to wait. The seller commits a fixed
price path and under this assumption the seller has to choose the discount price p. The
study considers two discounting strategies: contingent and fixed discounts. In the former
case, the magnitude of the discount depends on the remaining inventory. The latter indicates
that the discounting factor is announced at the beginning. The authors also test the seller’s
discount price in both contingent and fixed discount cases. Their results can be grouped.
First, pre-commitment is of benefit to a firm when consumers behave strategically. Second,
the presence of strategic consumers affect how the firm’s inventory influences the depth of
discount. Last, ignorance of the strategic consumer induces significant losses to the firm.
Levin et al. (2007) study monopoly and duopoly settings with a fixed number of con-
sumers whose valuations are random along the horizon. They introduce a dynamic model
that includes an internal price guarantee instrument. They consider that the initial price
guarantee provides a consumer with compensation if the price of the product decreases below
the strike price. Consumers can choose whether to accept or reject the guarantee. When
they buy, they pay a fee. A price guarantee encourages an early purchase. For the firm, an
increase in the number of early purchases reduces the uncertainty of late purchases. It also
improves consumer satisfaction by capacity planning. In addition, the fee of the guaran-
tee from the consumer exceeds potential average loss. The collected fee provides additional
revenue.
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Su (2007) studies the impact of strategic consumer behavior in which he allows pricing
to increase or decrease over periods. Consumers are modeled in two dimensions: customers
having high or low valuations and high patient or impatient. In this way, it can be studied
by four segments of consumers: strategic-high, strategic-low, patient-high and patient-low.
The result shows that increasing prices are optimal when high valuation consumers are more
strategic but decreasing prices are optimal when high valuation consumers are more myopic.
It also emphasizes that strategic behavior implies that when prices are high initially, demand
is not lost; rather it cumulates in sales if prices are lowered eventually. Furthermore, scarcity
causes strategic consumers to compete and therefore leads to purchases at higher prices.
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3 The Model
In this section, we now formally describe our two-period dynamic pricing model. The com-
plete notation is provided at the end of this section. Let pθt be the price of the product
of quality θ in period t, where θ ∈ {H,L}, denoting high and low quality respectively,
t ∈ {1, 2}.
Over two periods, a firm may sell two different qualities of the same product: high and
low quality. The firm predetermines the pricing path over the two periods but announces
the prices sequentially. We restrict the price such that (i) the high quality product price to
be higher than the low quality product and (ii) in each case, (high or low quality), the first
period price is higher than the second period price (i.e., pH1 > pL1, pH2 > pL2, pH1 > pH2
and pL1 > pL2). In addition, all decision variables and constants are positive through out
this dissertation. We assume that the firm is able to offer enough units to meet all realized
demand. That is, we abstract away from inventory considerations.
Consumers is uniformly distributed along the linear line [0, 1] and each customer’s loca-
tion is denoted by i. Consumers have heterogeneous utilities, denoted by u(·) and a unit
demand for a product. In each period, consumers arrive continuously. We distinguish two
types of consumers: myopic and strategic.
Myopic consumers visit the firm in the first period and purchase the product with the
quality that offers the highest positive utility. When the utility is less than zero or less (i.e.,
u(·) ≤ 0), the consumers may exit and return in the second period, at which time, she makes
the same purchasing decision.
By rational expectations, strategic consumers correctly predict the the firm’s choice of
quality for the second period and the corresponding prices. Thus, strategic consumers visit
the firm in the first period, and choose the time and product that yield the most utility, given
the consumer’s location, i. Thus, a strategic consumer may delay her purchase to the second
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period although positive utility could be obtained in the first period as she is interested in
maximizing her utility over the entire remaining time.
Demand Side
We describe consumers’ derivation of utility. When consumers arrive to the store, they
observe the firm’s quality choices (i.e., whether a high quality product, αH , is offered, a low
quality product,αL, is offered or both) and the prices (pH1, pL1 pH2, andpL2). Each consumer
has a utility uθt from purchasing a product of quality θ in period t. Consumers who purchase
in the first period, obtain both utilities from the first and an additional discounted utility
from the second period. Consumers who purchase in the second period, obtain only the
discounted utility in the second period. Especially, a consumer located at i obtains a utility
of iαθ from a product of quality θ if he owns the product in the first period and obtains
a utility of iδαθ from a product if he owns the product in the second period as well. This
uθt(αθ, δ, pθt ; i):
uθt =

i αθ (1 + δ) − pθ1
i αθ (δ) − pθ2,
where θ ∈ {H,L}.
Figure 1 illustrates one of scenarios. The following explanation is based on Figure 1.
The first period
Consider the first period. Strategic consumers are intertemporal utility-maximizers, since
they select the time and product that yield the highest utility. For example, suppose that
the utility from purchasing high quality product in the first period is uH1 and the utility
from purchasing high quality product in the second period is uH2 (see upper right in Figure
1). Strategic consumers purchase the high quality product in the first period, since for these
consumers uH1 ≥ uH2, while some other strategic consumers will purchase this product in
the second period as for these consumers uH2 ≥ uH1.
A strategic consumer chooses the product quality and time which provide the maximum
9
Figure 1: An Example of Consumers’ Utilities and Corresponding Demands
utility, max{uH1, uL1, uH2, uL2}. Strategic consumers’ demand for the product θ in period t
is expressed as qsθt.
Consider the myopic consumers. Myopic consumers purchase the product once they visit
a store if the utility is positive. In the first period, the consumers face the decision of which
quality of the product to purchase. Some of the myopic consumers choose to purchase the
high quality products, since for these consumers uH1 ≥ uL1 while some others will choose
the low quality product if in their case uL1 ≥ uH1. Let θ1 and θ2 to be the quality choices in
period 1 and 2, respectively. In general, given uθ11 and uθ21, a myopic consumer in the first
period purchases αθ1 in the period 1 if and only if uθ11 ≥ uθ21 where θ1, θ2 ∈ {H,L}, θ1 ̸= θ2.
The number of units of quality, θt , purchased by myopic consumers in the period t is ex-
pressed as qmθt , where t ∈ {1, 2}. The Second period
In this period, strategic and myopic consumers behave in the same way. Given uθ12 and
uθ22, a myopic consumer purchases αθ1 in period 2 if and only if uθ12 ≥ uθ22, where θ1, θ2 ∈
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{H,L}, θ1 ̸= θ2.
The Firm’s Pricing Decision
We now study the firm’s optimization problem. We have seen how the consumers’ demand
to be determined, so we omit the demand consideration. See the strategic consumers’ demand
depicted by the two-sided arrow in the upper part and the myopic consumers’ demand
depicted by the two-sided arrow in the lower part in Figure 1. Note that a strategic consumer
at point A has the same utility if she purchases a high quality product in each of the periods.
Therefore, she might buy now or later. A myopic consumer at point B has the same utility
if she purchases or not in the first period.
Now, the firm is able to anticipate the quantity demand by both the strategic and myopic




















(β ·Revs + (1− β) ·Revm) .
Finally, the firm is able to set the prices (i.e., pH1, pH2, pL1 and pL2) over two periods by
differentiating with respect to the price in each case.
Notation
We summarize the notation used in this dissertation. αθ refers the quality product θ with
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0 ≤ αL ≤ αH ≤ 1, where θ ∈ {H,L}
β is a share of strategic consumers with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
δ is the discounting factor of strategic consumers with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
i is the consumer location with 0 ≤ i ≤ 1.
uθt is the consumer utility from product quality θ in the period t, where θ ∈ {H,L}, t ∈ {1, 2}.
i∗∗t is the intersection point of two utility functions, high and low quality in period t.
i∗θt is the i-intercept of the θ quality product utility function in period t.
i∗θ1θ2 is the intercept point of the two utility functions in 1st period and 2nd period.
Ui∗∗t is the consumer utility at i=i
∗∗
t .




is the consumer utility at i=i∗θ1θ2 .
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4 Model Analysis
In this section, we study the different scenarios that may occur based on the retailer’s choice
of qualities to offer in each of the periods and corresponding prices. We distinguish between
three main broad groups of scenarios:
Case 1–in which the second period utility function dominates the first period utility function.
Case 2–in which the first period utility function dominates the second period utility function.
Case 3–in which the both period utility functions meet in the range.
4.1 Scenario Analysis
The retailer can choose to offer only one quality or both qualities of the product in each
period. Therefore, we identify the following cases: Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3. Next, we
analyze each of cases separately, and consider the different scenarios each case entails. The
different scenario described in Figure 2 are based on the potential relationships between the
available products in period 1 and period 2, and the points where the utility has intersect.
We solve and obtain the prices by assuming each case is feasible.
Case 1
In Case 1, we have several scenarios (see Figure 2). In all scenarios, the utility functions in the
second period dominate those in the first period. This implies that all strategic consumers
wait for the second period so none of them purchases in the first period. Intuitively, when
this happens max{uH2, uL2} > max{uH1, uL1}. We find that only Case 1D2 is feasible. Case
1A
In this scenario, the retailer offers both high and low quality of the product in both periods.
If the scenario is feasible then (i∗∗2 ,Ui∗∗2 ) must exist in the first quadrant. In other words,
i∗∗2 > 0 and Ui∗∗2 > 0.
13
(a) Case 1A1 (b) Case 1A2 (c) Case 1B1
(d) Case 1B2 (e) Case 1B3 (f) Case 1B4
(g) Case 1C1 (h) Case 1C2 (i) Case 1D1
(j) Case 1D2 (k) Case 1E1 (l) Case 1E2
Figure 2: Representative Instances for Case 1
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Lemma 1 Case 1A is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.






















= 0, which violates the assumption that Ui∗∗2 should
be strictly positive. Hence, Case 1A1 is infeasible.
Case 1A2
In this scenario, the retailer offers both high and low quality of the product in both periods.
If the scenario is feasible, then (i∗∗1 ,Ui∗∗1 ) must exist in the first quadrant. In other words,
i∗∗1 > 0 and Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 2 Case 1A2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 1A2 is feasible. Then Ui∗∗1 > 0.









In this scenario, the low quality product is not offered in the first period. Hence, whenever
uH2 > uH1, we must have ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1> 0.
Lemma 3 Case 1B1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 1B1 is feasible. Then ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1> 0.
However, ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1







< 0 : contradiction.
Hence, the assumption uH2 − uH1 |i=1> 0 does not hold and Case 1B1 is infeasible.
Case 1B2
In this scenario, the low quality product is not offered in the first period. Hence, whenever
uH2 > uH1, we must have ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1> 0.
Lemma 4 Case 1B2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 1B2 is feasible. Then uH2 − uH1 |i=1> 0.




















< 0 : contradiction.
This violates the assumption that uH2 dominates and , hence, Case 1B2 is infeasible.
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Case 1B3
In this scenario, the high quality product is not offered in the first period.Hence, whenever
uH2 > uL1, we must have ui∗∗2 > 0.
Lemma 5 Case 1B3 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.



















Thus, we conclude that Case 1B3 is infeasible.
Case 1B4
In this scenario, the high quality product is not offered in the first period.Hence, whenever





Lemma 6 Case 1B4 is infeasible.
Proof. By a contradiction.
Assume i∗L1 < i
∗∗
2 . Then i
∗
L1 − i∗∗2 < 0.































> 0, which violates the assumption that i∗L1 − i∗∗2 < 0.
Therefore, Case 1B4 is infeasible.
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Case 1C1
In this scenario, the low quality product is not offered in the second period.Hence, whenever





Lemma 7 Case 1C1 is infeasible.
Proof. Showing that CASE 1C is not feasible.
Assumption 1: i∗L1 > 0












⇐⇒ 4αL + 4αLδ − δ + βδ > 0
⇐⇒ αL > δ(1−β)4(1+δ)




Assumption 2: i∗L1 < i
∗∗
1











4αL δ+4αL−αH δ+β αH δ
< 0
⇐⇒ 4αLδ + 4αL − δ + βδ < 0, By substituting αH = 1











that there is no value of αL for which Case 1C1 is feasible. Thus, We conclude that Case
1C1 is infeasible.
Case 1C2
In this scenario, the high quality product is not offered in the second period.Hence, whenever






Lemma 8 Case 1C2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 1C2 is feasible. Then i∗L1 < i
∗∗
1 .
But, i∗L1 − i∗∗1 = 12
(β+1)δ
3 δ+4+β δ
> 0, a contradiction. Hence, Case 1C2 is infeasible.
Case 1D1
In this scenario, the retailer offers the high quality product in both periods.Hence, whenever
uH2 > uH1, we must have ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1> 0.
Lemma 9 Case 1D1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 1D1 is feasible. Then ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1> 0.
But, ui∗H2 − ui∗H1 |i=1







< 0 : contradiction.
Hence, the assumption uH2 − uH1 |i=1> 0 does not hold and Case 1D1 is infeasible.
Case 1D2
In this scenario, the retailer offers the low quality product in the first period and the
high quality product in the second period.Hence, whenever uH2 > uL1, we must have
0 < i∗H2 < i
∗
L1 < 1, uH2 − uL1|(i=1) > 0.
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Proof. We test all assumptions.




> 0, which is always true.
Assumption 2: uH2 − uL1|(i=1) > 0
uH2 − uL1|(i=1) > 0 ⇐⇒ αHδ − pH2 > αL(1 + δ)− pL1
pH2 < αHδ + pL1 − αL(1 + δ) < αHδ + αH(1 + δ)− αL(1 + δ)
= αHδ + (αH − αL)(1 + δ), which is always true since pH2 < αHδ.
Assumption 3: i∗H2 < i
∗
L1

















Now, consider two cases:
(1) The numerator > 0 and the denominator > 0



































(2) The numerator < 0 and the denominator < 0













(δ+1)(β−1) < 0, which violates the assumption 0 < αL < 1
thus, we do not need to consider this case.





Assumption 4: i∗L1 < 1
Claim that i∗L1 − 1 < 0
⇐⇒ i∗L1 − 1 =
pL1
αL(1+δ)
− 1 = −2αLδ+αHδ−2αL
4αLδ+4αL−αHδ+βαHδ
< 0
Now, consider two cases:
(1) The numerator > 0 and the denominator < 0













































(2) The numerator < 0 and the denominator > 0






























In this scenario, the retailer offers the high quality product in the first period and the low
quality product in the second period.Hence, whenever uL2 > uLH , we must have i
∗
L2 >
0, uL2 − uH1|(i=1) > 0, i∗L2 < i∗H1 , and i∗H1 < 1.
Lemma 11 Case 1E1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.




> 0, which is always true.
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Assumption 2: uL2 − uH1|(i=1) > 0
⇐⇒ (αLδ − pL2)− (αH(1 + δ)− pH1) > 0
⇐⇒ αLδ − αLαHδ(β+βδ+1+δ)4αHδ+4αH−αLδ+βαLδ −
(








Note first, by substituting αH = 1, the numerator becomes:
4αLδ
2 + 4αLδ − αL2δ2 + αL2δ2β − βαLδ − βαLδ2 − 4δ − 2δ2 − 2
= (2αLδ
2 − 2δ2) + (2αLδ2 − 2) + (−4δ + 4αLδ)− αL2δ2 + (αL2δ2β − βαLδ)− βαLδ2
= −2 (1− αL)− 2(1− αLδ2)− 4δ(1− αL)− αL2δ2 − (1− αLδ)βαLδ − βαLδ2 < 0
Now, we need the condition: the denominator < 0;
⇐⇒ 4αHδ + 4αH − αLδ + βαLδ < 0
⇐⇒ αL > 4αH(1+δ)δ(1−β)
Hence, the assumption 2 holds iff αL >
4αH(1+δ)
δ(1−β) .
















Note the numerator: = −(1− β)αHδ − βαLδ − (1− β)αH < 0
Now, we need the condition: the denominator > 0;
⇐⇒ 4αHδ + 4αH − αLδ + βαLδ > 0
⇐⇒ αL < 4αH(1+δ)δ(1−β)
Hence, the assumption 3 holds iff αL <
4αH(1+δ)
δ(1−β) .
Assumption 4: i∗H1 < 1
⇐⇒ pH1
αH(1+δ)
< 1 ⇐⇒ pH1 < αH(1 + δ), which is always true.





δ(1−β) . This implies that there is no value of αL for which Case 1E1 is feasible.
Therefore, we conclude that Case 1E1 is infeasible.
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Case 1E2
In this scenario, the retailer offers the low quality product in both periods. Hence, whenever
uL2 > uL1, we must have uL2 − uL1|(i=1) > 0.
Lemma 12 Case 1E2 is infeasible.
Proof. By a contradiction.
Assume Case 1E2 is feasible. Then uL2 − uL1|(i=1) > 0. But,














< 0, since (−δ2 + 2) + βδ > 0
This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, Case 1E2 is infeasible.
Case 2
In Case 2 we have several scenarios (see Figure 3). In all scenarios, products in the first
period are always preferred over those in the second period. These cases are inferior to other
cases. In each case of the possible scenarios in Case 2, we must have uθ1 > uθ2, where
θ ∈ {H,L}. This implies that strategic consumers purchase the products in the first period.
Hence, strategic and myopic consumers behave in the same way, as they all purchase in the
first period, if they purchase at all. This leads all consumers purchase in the first period and
the firm would not offer the products in the second period. Consequently, this violates our
model assumption (two period time horizon) and makes it impossible to obtain the prices
in the second period. (i.e., pH2 and pL2). Therefore, we cannot prove scenarios. The major
proofs are following in two group:
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(a) Case 2A (b) Case 2B1 (c) Case 2B2
(d) Case 2C1 (e) Case 2C2 (f) Case 2C3
(g) Case 2D1 (h) Case 2D2 (i) Case 2D3
Figure 3: Representative Instances for Case 2
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Case 2A and 2B
Lemma 13 Case 2A and Case 2B are infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.





























= 0, which violates the assumption that Ui∗∗1 should be strictly positive.
Therefore, we conclude that Case 2A and Case 2B are infeasible. Case 2C and 2D
Lemma 14 Case 2C and Case 2D are infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume CASE 2C and CASE 2D are feasible. Then uH1 − uH2|(i=1) > 0.
But, uH1 − uH2|(i=1) = αH(1 + δ)− pH1 − (αHδ − pH2)
= αH > pH1 − pH2, this can not be shown if whether it is true or not since pH2 cane not
be determined in this cases.
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Case 3
In Case 3, we enumerate several scenarios (see Figure 4). In all scenarios, four consumer
utility functions meet each other in the range (i.e., 0 < i < 1). We test feasibility in each
case. We find that only Case 3D, Case 3E, Case 3F and Case 3G are feasible.
Case 3A1
In this scenario, uH1 and uH2 meet in the range. If this is feasible, we must have Ui∗∗2 > 0.
Lemma 15 Case 3A1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.



































X = 0 :contradiction




Hence, we conclude that Case 3A1 is infeasible.
Case 3A2
In this scenario, uH1 and uH2 meet in the range. If Case 3A2 is feasible we must have
Ui∗∗2 > 0.
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(a) Case 3A1 (b) Case 3A2 (c) Case 3B1
(d) Case 3B2 (e) Case 3C1 (f) Case 3C2
(g) Case 3C3 (h) Case 3C4 (i) Case 3D
(j) Case 3E (k) Case 3F (l) Case 3G
(m) Case 3H1 (n) Case 3H2 (o) Case 3H3
Figure 4: Representative Instances for Case 3
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Lemma 16 Case 3A2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.















































Hence, we conclude that Case 3A2 is infeasible.
Case 3B1
In this scenario, uH1 and uH2 meet in the range. If this is feasible, we must have Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 17 Case 3B1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.




















< 0 : contradiction,
, since the denominator and the numerator are positive.
Hence, we conclude that Case 3B1 is infeasible.
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Case 3B2
In this scenario, uH2 and uL1 meet in the range. If this is feasible, we must have Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 18 Case 3B2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.











−4β δ2−(6−β)β δ−3 δ−4 < 0 : contradiction.
Hence, we conclude that Case 3B2 is not feasible.
CASE 3C1
In this scenario, uH1 and uH2 meet in the range, but the low quality product is not offered
in the second period. If this is feasible, we must have 0 < i∗H2 < i
∗
L1 and Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 19 Case 3C1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 3C1 is feasible.
Then must satisfy assumption (1) 0 < i∗H2 < i
∗
L1 and assumption (2) Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Assumption (1) : 0 < i∗H2 < i
∗
L1













(ii) Let i∗H2 < i
∗
L1.




⇐⇒ − (1+δ)(βδ (αH−αL)+αL(1−β) )
β2δ2αH+βαHδ−αHδ−αHδ2β+4αLδ+5βαLδ2+5βαLδ−β2αLδ−β2αLδ2+4αL
< 0




Therefore, i∗H2 < i
∗
L1 iff αH <
αL(−4δ−5βδ2−5βδ+β2δ+β2δ2−4)
δ(β2δ+β−1−βδ)
From (i) and (ii), assumption (1) is satisfied iff αH <
αL(−4δ−5βδ2−5βδ+β2δ+β2δ2−4)
δ(β2δ+β−1−βδ)
Assumption (2) : Ui∗∗1 > 0.








β2δ2αH+β αH δ−αH δ−αH δ2β+4αL δ+5β αL δ2+5β αL δ−β2αL δ−β2αL δ2+4αL




Therefore, Ui∗∗1 > 0 iff αH >
αL(−4δ−5βδ2−5βδ+β2δ+β2δ2−4)
δ(β2δ+β−1−βδ)
From Assumption (1) and (2),
αH <
αL(−4δ−5βδ2−5βδ+β2δ+β2δ2−4)
δ(β2δ+β−1−βδ) and αH >
αL(−4δ−5βδ2−5βδ+β2δ+β2δ2−4)
δ(β2δ+β−1−βδ)
Hence there is no solution of αH satisfying the Assumption (1) and (2) simultaneously and
we conclude that Case 3C1 is infeasible.
Case 3C2
In this scenario, uL1 and uH2 meet in the range, but the low quality product is not offered








Lemma 20 Case 3C2 is infeasible.
Proof.
By contradiction.
We solve and obtain the following prices by assuming Case 3C2 is feasible. Assume Case 3C2
is feasible. Then the following assumptions (1),(2),(3),(4) and (5) are satisfied. Assumption




> 0, which holds.
Assumption 2: i∗H2 < i
∗
L1







⇐⇒ pH2 < αHδpL1αL(1+δ) ... 1⃝
Assumption 3: i∗L1 < i
∗
H2L1


















, otherwise. ... 3⃝








Assumption 4: i∗H2L1 < i
∗∗
1







⇐⇒ pH2 < (pH1−pL1)αHδ(αH−αL)(1+δ)
If αHδ − αL − αLδ < 0.
Then we can simplify this inequality equation by using 4⃝ and becomes


















, otherwise. ... 6⃝
Assumption 5: Ui∗∗1 > Ui∗H2L1
Ui∗∗1 − Ui∗H2L1 =
−αHpL1+pH1αL
αH−αL


















, otherwise. ... 8⃝


















Have to consider two cases: αHδ − αL − αLδ > 0 and αHδ − αL − αLδ < 0 separately.
First consider the case if αHδ − αL − αLδ > 0.




Hence. it is not possible to make a decision to pH2, so fail to satisfy the four assumptions.
Next consider the case if αHδ − αL − αLδ < 0.
Then from assumption 4 ( 6⃝) and assumption 5 ( 9⃝), pH2 < (pH1−pL1)αL(αH−αL) and pH2 >
(pH1−pL1)αL
(αH−αL)
. Thus, it is not possible to make a decision to pH2, so fail to satisfy the four
assumptions. Consequently, the four assumptions above cannot be satisfied so Case 3C2 is
infeasible.
Case 3C3
In this scenario, uH1 and uL2 meet in the range, but the high quality product is not offered
in each period. If this is feasible, we must have Ui∗∗1 > 0.
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Lemma 21 Case 3C3 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.













−αLδ + αH + αHδ + βαLδ + βαH + βαHδ
= (αLδ + αH + αHδ) β − αLδ + αH + αHδ
= (αLδ + αH + αHδ) β + (αH − αL) δ + αH > 0
For the denominator
−3δ2αH − βδ2αH + 3δ2αL − 3βαLδ2 − 7αHδ − βαHδ − 5βαLδ + δβ2αL + 4αLδ − 4αH
= (−3δ2 − βδ2 − 7δ − βδ − 4)αH + δβ2αL − 3βαLδ2 + 3δ2αL − 5βαLδ + 4αLδ
= (−3δ2 − βδ2 − 3δ − 4δ − βδ − 4)αH + (−5 + β) βαLδ + 3δ2αL − 3βαLδ2 + 4αLδ
= (−3δ2 − βδ2 − βδ − 3δ − 4)αH + 4 (−αH + αL) δ + (−5 + β) βαLδ + 3δ2αL − 3βαLδ2






< 0 : contradiction.
Hence, the assumption Ui∗∗1 > 0 is false and Case 3C3 is infeasible.
Case 3C4
In this scenario, uL1 and uL2 meet in the range, but the high quality product is not offered
in the second period. If this is feasible, we must have Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 22 Case 3C4 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
















−4βδ2−[ (6−β)β+3 ] δ−4 < 0 : contradiction.
Hence, the assumption Ui∗∗1 > 0 is false and Case 3C4 is not feasible.
Case 3D
In this scenario, uH1 and uH2 meet in the range. The high quality product is offered in each
period. Case 3D is feasible if and only if i∗H1 < i
∗
H1H2 < 1.
Lemma 23 Case 3D is feasible.
Proof.
Without Loss of Generality (W.L.O.G), substitute αH = 1 into all equations below:





< pH1 − pH2
⇐⇒ pH1 < (pH1 − pH2)(1 + δ)
⇐⇒ pH1δ > pH2(1 + δ)
⇐⇒ pH1 > pH2(1+δ)δ
⇐⇒ pH1 − pH2(1+δ)δ > 0
Substituting pH1 = −
2(βδ3+2βδ2+βδ+1+2δ+δ2)















−6βδ−4βδ2−3δ−(4−β2δ) > 0 : True.
Hence, assumption 1 is satisfied.
Assumption 2: i∗H1H2 < 1
⇐⇒ pH1 − pH2 < 1
⇐⇒ pH1 − pH2 − 1 < 0
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⇐⇒ −−3βδ2−5β δ−2+δ2+β2δ−6βδ−4βδ2−4−3δ+β2δ , by substituting prices
⇐⇒ (5−β)β δ+3β δ
2+(2−δ2)
−6βδ−4βδ2−3δ−(4−β2δ) < 0 : True.
Hence, assumption 2 is satisfied.
Assumption 1 and 2 above hold so Case 3D is feasible.
Case 3E
In this scenario, uH1 and uL2 meet in the range. The firm offers the high quality product in
the first period and the low quality product in the second period. Case 3E is feasible if and
only if the following two assumptions hold: Ui∗H1L2 > 0 and i
∗
H1L2 < 1.
Lemma 24 Case 3E is feasible.
Proof.
We test the following two assumptions are satisfied.
W.L.O.G., substitute αH = 1 into all equations below:



















X = 4δ2 − 5αLδ2 + 2 + 6βαLδ2 − 2βαL2δ2 + 6βαLδ − δ2β2αL + 8δ + δ2β2αL2
+ αL
2δ2 + 2− δβ2αL
= 4 (1− αL) δ2 + (2− αLδ2) + 4βαLδ2 + 2 (1− αL) βαLδ2 + (1− βδ) βαLδ + 5βαLδ
+ (8− 5αL) δ + δ2β2αL2 + αL2δ2 + (2− δβ2αL) > 0
Thus, assumption 1 is satisfied.
Assumption 2: i∗H1L2 < 1
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1− i∗H1L2 = 1−
−pL2+pH1
−αLδ+αH+αHδ
= Y−X > 0, where
Y = −2δ2 − 5βαLδ2 + δ2β2αL + 4αLδ2 − δ2β2αL2 + 2βαL2δ2 − αL2δ2 − 4δ − 5βαLδ
+ δβ2αL + 4αLδ − 2
= −4 (1− αL) δ − 2(1− αLδ2)− 2 (1− αL) δ2 − 2 (1− αL) βαLδ2 − 3βαLδ2 − (1− βδ) βαLδ
− (4− β) βαLδ − δ2β2αL2 − αL2δ2 < 0
Thus, assumption 2 is satisfied.
Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied hence, Case 3E is feasible.
Case 3F
In this scenario, uL1 and uL2 meet in the range. The firm offers the low quality product in
each period. Case 3F is feasible if and only if the following three assumptions hold: i∗L2 > 0 ,
Ui∗L1L2 > 0 and i
∗
L1L2 < 1.
Lemma 25 Case 3F is feasible.
Proof.
We test assumptions the following:




> 0 ,True; hence,the assumption 1 holds.





αLδ(2β δ−δ2+β δ2−2 δ−1+β)
−6β δ−4β δ2−4−3 δ+β2δ =
−αLδ(1+δ)2(1−β)
−6β δ−4β δ2−4−(3−β2)δ > 0
Hence, assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 3: i∗L1L2 < 1
i∗L1L2 − 1 =
pL1−pL2
αL
− 1 = 5β δ+3β δ2+2−β2δ−δ2−6β δ−4β δ2−4−3 δ+β2δ =
(5−β)β δ+3β δ2+(2−δ2)
−6β δ−4β δ2−4−(3−β2)δ < 0
Hence, assumption 3 holds.
All three assumptions are satisfied; therefore, Case 3F is feasible.
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Case 3G
In this scenario, uL1 and uH2 meet in the range. The firm offers the low quality product in
the first period and the high quality product in the second period. Case 3G is feasible if and
only if the following three assumptions hold: i∗H2 > 0, Ui∗L1H2 > 0 and i
∗
L1H2 < 1.





We test that all assumptions are satisfied.
W.L.O.G., set αH = 1.




> 0, True; hence, assumption 1 holds.
Assumption 2: Ui∗L1H2 > 0








Have to consider two cases: (1) and (2) below.
(1) The numerator > 0 and the denominator > 0

























Note that, 2⃝ can be omitted, since two different vales of αL at the same time
does not make sense.
(2) The numerator < 0 and the denominator < 0


















, otherwise. ... 4⃝
Note that, 3⃝ can be omitted as the same reason with 2⃝.
Hence, assumption 2 holds if 1⃝ OR 4⃝
Assumption 3: i∗L1H2 < 1
Assume i∗L1H2 − 1 < 0.
Then i∗L1H2 − 1 =
−pL1+pH2
−αL−αL δ+αH δ
− 1 = pL1−pH2−αL−αLδ+δ
αL+αL δ−δ
< 0......... 5⃝
Let’s consider two cases: the denominator and the numerator.
(1) The denominator
We draw four different quantities in this scenario (see Figure 5) by Maple.
It suffices that showing the myopic consumer quantity demand is positive.
Figure 5 shows that there is a threshold αL above which the myopic
consumer quantity demand in second period, denoted by Qtym2 , is positive.
Thus, have to define α̂L.
If Qtym2 = 0











by substituting the optimal prices and αH = 1.




. Hence, Qtym2 > 0, when αL > α̂L ≡ δ1+δ .




This leads αL + αL δ − δ > 0, which is the denominator of 5⃝.
(2) The numerator












⇐⇒ αL > pL1−pH2+δ1+δ ⇐⇒ pL1 − pH2 − αL − αLδ + δ < 0
Hence, the numerator = pL1 − pH2 − αL − αLδ + δ < 0 and i∗L1H2 − 1 < 0.




From assumption 1, 2, and 3, Case 3G is feasible if and only if ether ( 1⃝ and 6⃝) or ( 4⃝ and
6⃝) holds. However, there is no value of αL satisfying the condition: ( 4⃝ and 6⃝).








Figure 5: The Quantity Demand in Case 3G
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Case 3H1
In this scenario, four consumer utility functions meet each other. If Case 3G is feasible then
we must have Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 27 Case 3H1 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.











2(−4−4βδ2−([6−β]β+3)δ) < 0 : contradiction.
Case 3H2
In this scenario, three consumer utility functions meet each other. The firm does not offer
the low quality product in the second period. If Case 3H2 is feasible then we must have
Ui∗∗1 > 0.
Lemma 28 Case 3H2 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 3H2 is feasible. Then i∗H1H2 > i
∗∗
1 .





























Canceling the terms, the numerator is equal to zero.
Hence, i∗H1H2 − i∗∗1 = 0 ,which violates the assumption i∗H1H2 > i∗∗1 .
Consequently, Case 3H2 is infeasible.
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Case 3H3
In this scenario, two qualities of the product are offered in both periods and uL1 and uL2. If
Case 3H3is feasible then we must have i∗∗1 > i
∗
L1L2.
Lemma 29 Case 3H3 is infeasible.
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume Case 3H3 is feasible. Then i∗∗1 > i
∗
L1L2.












−4(1+βδ2)−([6−β]β+3)δ < 0: contradiction.
Hence, i∗∗1 − i∗L1L2 < 0, which violates the assumption i∗∗1 − i∗L1L2 > 0.
Consequently, Case 3H3 is infeasible.
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4.2 The Practical Use and Corresponding Scenarios
We discuss each of our five feasible scenarios in terms of practical application.
First, Case 1D2 shows that the high quality utility function in the second period domi-
nates the low quality utility function in the first period. Particularly, in Case 1D2 all strategic
consumers delay their purchases to the second period and they only purchase high quality
products. Myopic consumers all buy the low quality product in the first period. This is
the extreme case, which is hardly found in practice although this scenario is mathematically
feasible.
Second, Case 3D is interpreted as offering only the high quality product in both periods
and results in the best profit to the firm. This indicates that there is no need to produce
two different qualities of the same products. In fact, one might intuitively know this result,
but this theoretical study proves it.
Third, Case 3E suggests that the firm provides the high quality products in the first period
and the low quality products in the second period. In the introduction section, we show an
example in the computer software industry. This scenario works well in that example. Once
the firm releases the new product, it sells the professional version of the product at the high
price in the first period and sells the student version of the product at the low price in the
second period. this scenario turns to the best if β = 1.
Fourth, we notice that offering the low quality products in both periods, Case 3F, is
inferior than offering the high quality products in both periods, Case 3D, since no firm sells
low quality products in both periods. Thus, we omit the discussion of Case 3F. Although
it might be profitable in the short run, it might hurt the profit in the long run since this
scenario does not meet consumer desire for the high quality products.
Last, Case 3G denotes the instance wherein the firm provides the low quality products
in the first period and the high quality products in the second period. This strategy also
42
has been used in software industry. For example, Ahnlab, which is the well-known Korean
Anti-Virus software producer, offers the first version of a new product (low quality product)
at the beginning. It revises errors if any exist or increases performance according to con-
sumer comments and offers the complete product later (high quality product). One study
of upgrading pricing related to this scenario can be found in Bala and Carr (2009).
We use Maple Optimization package and LINGO, optimization software, to obtain the
optimal maximum possible profit of the each of feasible scenarios (see Table 1). However,
many of the optimal solutions in each case explain that in order to capitalize, the firm should
not have the strategic consumers (β = 0) but this is hardly found in practice and these cases
are too extreme. Consequently, we choose three feasible scenarios which are considered to be
more practical and test by setting different values for the constants, particularly, beta and
delta. Unexpectedly, the feasible scenario Case 3G is extremely beneficial (see Figure 6) if
the difference between two qualities is very large (say αH = 1and αL = 0.25).
Scenario Case 1D2 Case 3D Case 3E Case 3F Case 3G
αH 1 1 1 NA 1
αL 0.85 NA 0.0795 1 1
β 0 0 1 0 0
δ 1 1 1 1 1
pH1 NA 1.14 1.14 NA NA
pL1 0.99 NA NA 1.14 1.14
pH2 0.29 0.29 NA NA NA
pL2 NA NA 0.29 0.29 0.29
Profit 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.57
Table 1: Optimal Solution of The Feasible Scenarios
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Figure 6: Feasible Solution Analysis (note: Case 3G is feasible only for β > 0.2)
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5 The Optimal Scenario
We have identified the five feasible scenarios: Case 1D2, Case 3D, Case 3E, Case 3F and
Case 3G. In this section, we find the scenario which offers the best profit for the firm. We
first show that the profit of Case 3D dominates all other feasible scenarios.We then further
characterize the best scenario, Case 3D.





The proof is followed easily from requires the following four Lemmas: Lemma 30, 31, 32 and
40.
From Lemma 30: π3D ≥ π1D2, if αL > δ2(1+δ) .
From Lemma 31: π3D ≥ π3E along with our global assumption 0 ≤ αL ≤ αH ≤ 1.
From Lemma 32: π3D ≥ π3F , when 0 ≤ αL ≤ αH ≤ 1.









a setting αH = 1.










We show that π3D ≥ π1D2, when αL > α̂L.
















Now, consider the first order condition.
∂△π
∂αL
= 0 ⇐⇒ αL = αHδ2(1+δ) ≡ α̂L

















|αL=α̂L< 0, which means that π3D − π1D2
has the local maximum at α̂L =
αHδ
2(1+δ)
, and it shows that the profit difference is concave
downward near α̂L.
Next, we have to check in which range of αL, π
3D − π1D2 is positive.
W.L.O.G., set αH = 1. First, check the low bound of αL. Substituting αL = 0, the profit
difference becomes π3D − π1D2|(αL=0) =
βδ3+2βδ2+βδ+1+2δ+δ2
6βδ+4βδ2+3δ+4−β2δ > 0.
Now, check the upper range of αL. Substituting αL = 1, the profit difference becomes









since that the denominator and the numerator are negative. Therefore, we have shown
that π3D − π1D2 is concave downward and has the local maximum at α̂L. In addition,
π3D − π1D2|(αL=0) > 0 and π3D − π1D2|(αL=1) > 0. This means that π3D − π1D2 > 0, where
αL ∈ [0, 1]. With the feasibility of Case 1D2 (αL > α̂L ≡ αHδ2(1+δ) from Lemma 10 and the






Lemma 31 The profit of Case 3D dominates the profit of Case 3E (i.e., π3D ≥ π3E) .
Proof.
We prove that π3D ≥ π3E.








W.L.O.G., assuming αH = 1 to make the calculation more tractable, π
3D − π3E becomes
−δ(δ+1)2(−1+αL)(β−1)2(βαLδ2+αLδ−δ−1)
(−6βδ−4βδ2−4−3δ+δβ2)(4δ2−δ2β2αL+6βαLδ2−5αLδ2+δ2β2αL2−2βαL2δ2+αL2δ2+8δ−δβ2αL+6βαLδ−5αLδ+4)
(1) Showing that the numerator < 0
For the last term :
(βαLδ
2 + αLδ − δ − 1) = (βαLδ2 − δ) + (αLδ − 1) = −δ(βαL1− δ)− (1− αLδ) < 0
Consequently, this leads the numerator< 0.
(2) Showing that the denominator < 0
For the first term :
(−6βδ − 4βδ2 − 4− 3δ + δβ2) = −6βδ − 4βδ2 − 3δ − (4− δβ2) < 0
For the second term :
(4δ2−δ2β2αL+6βαLδ2−5αLδ2+δ2β2αL2−2βαL2δ2+αL2δ2+8δ−δβ2αL+6βαLδ−5αLδ+4)
= (δ2β2 − 2βδ2 + δ2)αL2 + (−δ2β2 + 6βδ2 − δβ2 + 6βδ − 5δ − 5δ2)αL + 4δ2 + 8δ + 4
= δ2 (β − 1)2 α2L + (−δ2β2 + 6βδ2 − δβ2 + 6βδ − 5δ − 5δ2)αL + 4δ2 + 8δ + 4 > 0
, Since −δ2β2αL + 6βδ2αL − δβ2αL + 6βδαL − 5δαL − 5δ2αL + 4δ2 + 8δ + 4
= (6βδ2αL + 6βδαL + 4δ
2 + 8δ + 4)− (δ2β2αL + δβ2αL + 5δαL + 5δ2αL)
= (6βδ2αL − δ2β2αL)+ (6βδαL − δβ2αL)+ (8δ− 5δαL)+ (4δ2 − 4δ2αL)+ (4− δ2αL)
= βδ2αL(6− β) + βδαL(6− β) + δ(8− 5αL) + 4δ2(1− αL) + (4− δ2αL) > 0
Hence, the denominator < 0
From (1) and (2), π3D ≥ π3E = The numerator<0
The denominator<0
> 0 (i.e., π3D ≥ π3E).
Therefore, we conclude that the profit of Case 3D dominates the profit of Case 3E.
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Lemma 32 The profit of Case 3D dominates the profit of Case 3F (π3D ≥ π3F ).
Proof.





Hence, the profit of Case 3D dominates the profit of Case 3F.
Lemma 33 The profit of Case 3D dominates the profit of Case 3G if αL >
δ
(1+δ)
(i.e., π3D ≥ π3G).
Proof.
First, test if a threshold exists.
First of all, find this point α̂L.
















2 − 2β2δ3αH2 + βδ3αH2 − 4βδ3αHαL + 4β2δ3αHαL + 4βδ3αL2
+ αH
2δ2 + δ2αH
2β2 − 2βαH2δ2 − β3δ2αHαL − βαHαLδ2 − 4αHδ2αL + 6δ2αHβ2αL
− δ2β2αL2 + 3αL2δ2 + 10βαL2δ2 − δαHβ2αL + 6βαHαLδ − 5αHαLδ + 7αL2δ
− δαL2β2 + 6βδαL2 + 4αL2
X =αH
2δ2 + δ2αH
2β2 − 2βαH2δ2 − δ2αHβ2αL − 5αHδ2αL + 6βαHαLδ2 + 4αL2δ2
− δαHβ2αL − 5αHαLδ + 6βαHαLδ + 8αL2δ + 4αL2
Y =
(
−4− 21δ2 + δ4β2 + 3β2δ3 − 4βδ5 − 18δ4β − 30βδ3








2 + 7δ4αH + 4αH − 7δ2αHβ2 − 4δ5αHβ2 + 35αHδ2










2δ3 − 5δ5βαH2 − β3δ5αH2 + 13βαH2δ2 + 3δ2αH2β2 − 15αH2δ2
−9δ4βαH2 − 5αH2δ + 6δ5αH2β2 − δαH2β2 − β3αH2δ2 − 15αH2δ3 − 3β3δ4αH2
−3β3δ3αH2 + 15δ3αH2β2 + 17δ4αH2β2 − 5δ4αH2
)
αL




3 − 3β2δ4αH3 − 2βαH3δ2









2β2 − δ2αHβ2αL − δαHβ2αL − 4βαH2δ2 + 5βαHαLδ2
+ 5βαHαLδ + 2αH





2β2 − 2βαH2δ2 − δ2αHβ2αL − 5αHδ2αL + 6βαHαLδ2
+4αL


























Now, we have the threshold α̂L ≡ −αHδ(β−1)2(1+δ) , since two other points are not Real number.











2δ3 − 3δ3αHαL2 + 3αLαH2δ2 + 3βδ3αH3 − 6αHδ2αL2 + β3δ3αH3 − 3αHαL2δ
−3β2δ3αH3 + δ3αL3 + 3αL3δ2 + 3αL3δ − αH3δ3 + αL3 + 3δ2β2αL3
+3δβ2αL
3 + β2αL
3 − 18βδ2αL3 − 18βδαL3 − 6βαL3 + δ3β2αL3 − 6δ3βαL3











2β2 − 2βαH2δ2 − δ2αHβ2αL − 5αHδ2αL + 6βαHαLδ2 + 4αL2δ2

















This means that π3D − π3G has a local maximum at α̂L ≡ αHδ(1−β)2(1+δ) .
In other words, the profit difference is concave downward near α̂L.
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Next, we have to check in which range of αL, π
3D − π3G is positive.
W.L.O.G., set αH = 1. First, check the lower bound of αL. Substituting αL = 0, the profit







(−6βδ−4βδ2−4−3δ+β2δ)δ2(β−1)2 > 0, since both the denominator and the
numerator are negative.
Now, check the upper bound of αL. Substituting αL = 1, the profit difference becomes




4βδ2−β2δ+3δ+6βδ+4 = 0. Therefore, we have shown
that π3D − π1D2 is concave downward and has the local maximum at α̂L. In addition,
π3D − π3G|(αL=0) > 0 and π3D − π1D2|(αL=1) = 0. This implies that π3D − π3G > 0, where
αL ∈ [0, 1). With the feasibility of Case 3G (αL > δ1+δ by Lemma 26), we conclude that the




Analysis of Case 3D
In general, the increase in delta means that the consumer utility in the first period is
increased. Both types of consumers tend to purchase in the first period at the high price.
This leads to higher profits. The profit increases a maximum of 104% when the plausible
parameters are set at {αH = 1, αL = 0.5, β = 0.5}. Many studies have shown that the
increased number of strategic consumers has a negative effect on the firm’s profit. In our
study the profit loss is 8.3% when the parameters are set at {αH = 1, αL = 0.5, δ = 0.5}.
We analyze whether product substitution is necessary, but our analysis suggests that of-
fering only one quality of the same product in each period is the optimal strategy for the firm.
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6 Conclusion and Remarks
It is well known that the presence of strategic consumers has a negative effect on a firm’s
profit. In this thesis, we study product and intertemporal substitution in a dynamic pricing
model in the presence of strategic consumers. We enumerate scenarios, prove feasibilities and
choose the best scenario which provides the most profit for the firm. Our result shows that
a firm is better offering only a single quality of the product. Particularly, the highest profit
is realized when only the high quality product is offered in each of the two periods. Clearly,
fewer strategic consumers mean higher profit. In addition, the increase in the discount factor,
δ, allows a strategic consumer to purchase at a high price. Therefore the firm must consider
carefully the discount factor particularly in our optimal scenario (Case 3D).
Strictly speaking, we have assumed that both types of consumers are utility maximizers
and simply set the consumer linear utility function with quality variation in the form u(·),
which may not be realistic. There are studies showing people are not utility maximizers.
However, the contribution of this dissertation is to show that product substitution may be
beneficial to a firm in some setting.
Although we find the optimal scenario, other feasible scenarios (Case 3E, Case 3G) also
can be used if the condition, assumptions for a scenario, is satisfied. Our analysis also
has other implications. For examples, firms can choose pricing decisions according to their
expectations: how many strategic consumers would visit, how to set quality difference, which
quality of product to sell, the effect on their profit if they provide two qualities of the product
in the same period (if they have to use this scenario). This study is applicable to a firm’s
pricing decision depending on the firm’s operation environment.
This study may be extended to multiple periods. If a model can be focused on durable
goods, then capacity constraint and time limitation can be dealt with it. Furthermore, for
durable goods it is much easier to distinguish between strategic and myopic consumers as well
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as to manage inventory. Any consumer’s waiting cost or the cost of learning can be inserted
into the utility function although Su (2007) found that when the waiting cost is significantly
high, consumers are myopic; otherwise they are strategic. In the future our research plan is
to consider a setting in which the firm announces product prices dynamically in each period
in a multiple time horizon, and consumers react dynamically to the announced prices.
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